Human Identity and Workload Identity Should Not Share an Auth Method
OIDC fits interactive operators; AppRole fits non-interactive services. Combining them weakens both lifecycle models.
OIDC fits interactive operators; AppRole fits non-interactive services. Combining them weakens both lifecycle models.
Getting credentials onto a device is easy; binding the right device to the right backend identity is the security boundary.
Flashing firmware is only one step in turning a PCB into a managed product.
Enrollment establishes trusted identity; heartbeat reports what an already known device is doing.
A successful REGISTER proves more than network reachability because it joins device credentials to PBX state.
The keys in for_each become part of resource addresses. Renaming a key can look like deleting one object and creating another even when the human thinks only a label changed.
Scanning a code is useful only if the backend can prove which unit and account the ceremony joins.
State maps resource addresses in configuration to real remote objects. Treating it as disposable cache data is how infrastructure gets orphaned or recreated.
Losing the authenticator device creates a second-factor recovery problem that should not silently collapse to the password path.
We often treat a phone number as if it were a permanent identity. In reality, it is a communication address whose user can change, whose access can be lost, and whose presentation can be misleading.